Recent events in Asia and other parts of the globe have prompted calls from many quarters for international rescue of the monetary or fiscal authorities in distressed countries. We contrast the experience of rescues of monetary authorities before 1973 of advanced countries temporarily short of liquidity with recent experience of bailouts. International rescues in the past have involved relatively small amounts of money, sufficient to stave off devaluation or abandonment of a fixed exchange rate while remedial policies were put in place. Recent bailouts have involved handing over relatively large amounts to both foreign lenders and domestic investors after devaluation of a pegged exchange rate to avoid their incurring wealth losses. We document past rescues, whether successful or unsuccessful, by monetary regimes, and show what is different today from past experience.
Introduction
Recent events in Asia and other parts of the globe have prompted calls from many quarters for international rescue of the monetary or fiscal authorities in distressed countries, not only the current batch but also likely candidates for succor in years to come. The rescue of Mexico in 1995 is held up as an example of success that supports the rescue enterprise. The rationales for adopting this course range from the need to avoid contagion, the urgency of protecting investors, concern for preserving political stability, and the supposition that the countries have an implicit contract with the IMF to rescue them. We propose to examine the validity of these rationales against the background of the occasions in the past when international rescues were mounted. Rescues were sometimes successful, sometimes not. We explore the reasons for different outcomes. We want to know the conditions that led to an international rescue in the past and the terms of the rescue as a basis for comparison with actual or proposed current examples.
In Section 2, we define the terms we use, principally: what constituted a financial crisis that led to an international rescue; who were the agents that delivered international rescues; and on what conditions they extended loans. The financial crises that evoked the international rescues that we document were invariably currency crises. A currency crisis, defined as a clash between fundamentals and pegged exchange rates, whether fixed or crawling, signified that monetary and fiscal authorities were subjected to drains of international reserves that they held. Such drains threatened the liquidity of the authorities and raised doubts about the credibility of their capacity to preserve the prevailing foreign exchange value of the domestic currency. Sometimes banking panics also accompanied currency crises. In an older terminology, external and possibly internal drains were features of financial crises. The events that precipitated currency crises could emerge in a variety of circumstances. Typical circumstances included unanticipated real shocks (such as domestic or foreign harvest failures), wars and indemnities (which created adverse balances of trade), insolvency of financial institutions, and inability to service international debts.
The effects of a financial crisis varied with the type of monetary regime that prevailed. A financial crisis was a greater challenge to a flawed monetary regime than to a regime that functioned well. International rescues therefore did not achieve good results in a flawed regime.
The rescuers were historically central banks and governments, extending help to other central banks and governments. International agencies did not exist. In addition, private sector investment banks often undertook or participated in rescues. The loans were temporary, repayable on resolution of the financial crisis, and bore a market interest rate. Private sector loans were commercial operations.
The situation became more complex after 1914. Financial crises were often triggered in an environment characterized by inconsistencies and flaws in the structure of the interwar gold exchange standard and the Bretton Woods system. Rescues associated with crises generated by these systemic conditions on occasion temporarily resolved the crises, but ultimately did not, as the flawed system collapsed. The rescuers included international agencies, in addition to central banks, governments, and before the postwar era, private sector investment banks. Loans were made on commercial as well as concessional conditions. Swap agreements, introduced by the Federal Reserve in 1962, constituted a specialized form of international lending. 1 They were first used to resolve crises in the Bretton Woods era.
The biggest transformation in international rescues occurred after the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements. Financial crises that occasioned rescues in the aftermath were cases of insolvency rather than illiquidity, and the countries that were rescued had structural and microeconomic problems, not merely macroeconomic problems. The IMF was transformed from a provider of temporary balance-of-payments assistance to a provider of medium-term financing to heavily indebted countries. The World Bank was also transformed from a source of funds for development projects to a source of funds to support structural change in industry, agriculture and energy, as well as of sector adjustment loans.
In addition to these changes, another aspect of recent rescues is noteworthy. The argument driving international rescues in the decade of the 1990s that did not appear in earlier times is that they stave off contagion to countries that might have avoided a crisis if international conditions had not deteriorated. We discuss why it is that only recently has this argument surfaced, and why we believe the argument is overblown.
In Section 3, we review examples of international rescues, from the early nineteenth century to the 1990s. We discuss the checkered record of cooperation among central banks in times of exiguous gold or foreign exchange reserves (1825, 1839, 1847, 1857, 1890, 1895 and 1907) . In the interwar period stabilization loans were given to monetary authorities and governments. We do not regard these loans as international rescues. The financial support extended to Britain with an overvalued currency in 1931 and from Britain, France, the US and the BIS to Austria and Germany in 1931 were failed rescues. The flawed interwar gold exchange standard was the cause of the failures.
The US Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund began its career of stabilization loans in the mid-1930s. Lend-Lease and the Anglo-American Loan of 1946 were, respectively, a stabilization and a reconstruction loan, not rescues. 2 The Marshall Plan of [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] , was also a stabilization loan. 3 The IMF made an appearance in 1 A swap is an arrangement with a foreign central bank. Under Bretton Woods and in the immediate aftermath, it allowed the Federal Reserve to obtain foreign currency equivalent to a specified dollar ceiling for a designated period. Since the end of the Bretton Woods system, the purpose of a Federal Reserve swap with a foreign central bank is to provide the latter with dollars.
2 In 1945, the US-UK Loan Agreement settled British Lend-Lease obligations and extended a $3.75 billion reconstruction loan, then a very large amount, on concessional terms. The Lend-Lease debts, estimated at $21 billion gross, $17 billion net, were repaid to the US at 4 cents to the dollar. The reconstruction loan, payable over 50 years, with 5 years grace on principal, at a 2% per annum interest rate, was approved by Congress in 1946. The agreement prohibited use of the loan proceeds to satisfy previously existing claims of third parties on Britain.
the Suez crisis. It had only a limited role in the sterling crises of 1964-1967 and the franc crisis of 1968, which involved rescues as part of the pathology of Bretton Woods. We end our historical review with the debt crisis of 1982, which did not involve an international rescue.
In Section 4, we discuss how the rescues mounted in the 1990s differ from their predecessors, specifically the Mexican crisis of 1995, the current Asian crises, and the Russian crisis. Unlike their predecessors, these arose because of capital account, not current account, reversals. Capital flight produced the crisis in each country, beginning with a devaluation of the national currency that had fixed or crawling peg ties to the dollar or a basket of currencies.
The international rescues of the 1990s mark a watershed in the purpose, size and terms of the funds provided to countries in distress. The loans in the era before the 1990s were extended to help monetary authorities in their attempt to preserve a peg, while loans of the 1990s were made after the peg had collapsed and to bail out investors and lenders who would otherwise have suffered from the fall of the exchange rate. These bailouts have been justified on the grounds that they will prevent contagion spreading to other countries. The size factor is a reflection of the growth of international capital flows to the affected countries provided by banks and nonbank financial institutions of the industrialized world. The terms of the loans they arranged are an indication that the troubled countries were not only illiquid, they were also insolvent. The success of the rescues is in question.
In Section 5, we reach six conclusions about the differences between international rescues before the 1990s and the bailouts that have since occurred.
Some definitions
The definition of a financial crisis that elicited a rescue has remained constant over the centuries. Loss of international reserves by a country's monetary and fiscal authorities is at the root of the financial crises under consideration here. These were currency crises that threatened the foreign exchange value of the domestic currency. What has changed is the nature of a rescue, and the identity of the rescuer. They depend on the monetary regime.
Under the pre-1914 gold standard, a financial crisis occurred when a shortage of liquidity afflicted the monetary or fiscal authorities. The problem could arise because of a deficit in the balance of payments, and be complicated by a domestic banking panic. This meant that the fixed exchange rate of the national currency was endangered.
Countries that adhered to the gold standard can be viewed as members of a club. If they had no other priorities, they had an interest in supporting the existing pattern of exchange rates. Under such circumstances, the members would often cooperate in assisting the troubled country. The rescue involved the temporary provision of gold or foreign exchange to cover its deficit. Upon the correction of the balance of payments, the loan was repaid. The rescuer was one or more foreign central banks, sometimes acting at the direction of their governments. It was understood that, in other circumstances, the rescuer might need assistance, which would be forthcoming from members of the club with surplus reserves. However, if it was not in a member's self-interest to assist another, cooperation would be withheld. The members of the club were industrialized countries, not peripheral countries, many of which were colonial possessions of the members. If a peripheral country defaulted on an international debt, the rescue that was arranged was for a member's benefit.
The rescuer could also be a private investment firm that lent gold to a government on commercial terms to stem a loss of reserves. This was an international rescue to the extent that a syndicate of lenders, organized by a private firm, included banks of several countries. Again, the loan was temporary, repayable on restoration of the reserves.
World War I brought an end to the classical gold standard. In the attempt to revive the old system in the 1920s, members of the club extended stabilization loans to countries restoring or newly establishing the gold exchange standard. We do not regard stabilization loans as responses to financial crises. They were extended to help restore the functioning of an economy that had been disrupted by war.
The interwar gold exchange standard was flawed. Financial crises were unavoidable. The rescues that were arranged were occasioned by parity misalignments. If these were not corrected, the rescues had no prospect of succeeding. Since fundamental change in the regime's operations was not attempted, the regime collapsed in 1931. The loans that private sector firms made to gold-bloc countries in the late 1930s were also fruitless.
The first international agency to be established, dating from 1930, the BIS, initially had no rescue mandate. The US Treasury Exchange Stabilization Fund, established in 1934, without a statutory mandate, made stabilization loans to low-income countries, some of which it helped because of terms of trade reversals and other external shocks. The ESF pattern of lending to politically favored countries influenced the operation of the IMF (Schwartz, 1997) .
The creation of the Bretton Woods system after the war was based on the perception that private capital markets did not work. That perception underlay the establishment of international agencies; the IMF to deal with current account and terms of trade shocks and the World Bank to deal with economic development strategies. Capital controls were introduced to block international capital flows. Financial crises that punctuated the Bretton Woods era in large measure were produced by the systemic flaws of the regime. Industrialized countries with misaligned exchange rates were subjected to persistent current account deficits. Industrialized countries in surplus provided the funds to the countries in deficit, but again the rescues had no lasting positive effects.
The collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements in the early 1970s changed the monetary regime. The source of assistance also changed. American and European money-center and regional banks recycled surplus current account funds of OPEC countries to the less-developed countries to cover their deficits. The IMF and the World Bank were essentially bystanders during the 1970s.
Finally, we distinguish between the rescues before the 1990s and the bailouts since. Before this decade, rescue loans were made in an attempt to prevent a devalu-ation or abandonment of a pegged exchange rate. They were temporary loans and they accompanied a package of remedial policies. Recent rescue loans have been granted after the defense of the peg has failed. They have been granted to emerging countries in trouble, to offset potential losses for foreign bankers if the borrowers were unwilling to repay their loans at face value. The loans have also been channeled to the borrowing countries' banks that are insolvent because their liabilities (which are mainly short term) are denominated in revalued foreign currencies and their assets (which are mainly long term) in devalued domestic currencies.
International rescues before the 1990s
International rescues have a long history. Kindleberger (1989) describes loans made by the Bank of England to Dutch banks in the early eighteenth century, and suggests that there were predecessors. In this section we study the rescues of the past two centuries demarcated by international monetary regimes. In the period before World War II, rescue loans to central banks and sovereign governments were often arranged by or intermediated by private investment banks, such as Rothschilds, Barings and J.P. Morgan. Since World War II, all of the rescues have been arranged by official monetary authorities, or international agencies, such as the IMF, BIS and the World Bank. Meltzer (1991) has called to our attention a change in IMF procedures in 1987 that affected the bargaining position of lenders and borrowers and also the role of the IMF. Before that year, the IMF waited until private lenders worked out an arrangement with the borrower. Thereafter, the IMF lent first and later in larger amounts. In Table 1 , we document the series of rescues (some of which, to save space, are not described in the text), according to the circumstances involved, the lenders, the size and terms of the rescue (if known), and the outcome.
The gold standard, 1821-1914
In the century before World War I, frequent short-term loans were made to central banks and other monetary authorities to relieve pressure on their reserves during financial crises. The loans were regarded as a supplement to or, in some cases, as a substitute for other remedial actions designed to replenish the monetary authorities' reserves, such as raising the discount rate and credit rationing. In many cases the loans were made on a reciprocal basis. 3.1.1. The specie standard, 1821-1879 3.1.1.1. 1825 A major banking panic in London climaxed a business expansion of booming real activity, rising commodity prices, and speculation in Latin American stocks. In response to a rising trade deficit, in late 1824, the Bank sold exchequer bills (Neal, 1998; Bordo, 1998) . This triggered a stock market crash in April 1825, a downturn in commodity prices, bank failures, and a banking panic in December. The Bank was late in providing liquidity to the market that would have prevented bank failures and bankruptcies. Suspension of convertibility was averted by a loan of £400,000 from the Banque de France on Monday, December 19, through the intermediation of Rothschilds in Paris. 5 The loan was quickly repaid.
1836-1839
Like the 1825 crisis, a run-up in commodity prices and a stock market boom preceded the 1836 crisis in England (Temin, 1969; Levy-Leboyer, 1978) . In the face of an external drain, the Bank of England raised its discount rate, which ended the boom, turned commodity prices around, and led to panic and recession in 1837. According to Kindleberger, the Bank of England drew bills on Paris for £400,000. The following year both output and prices recovered, and a pattern similar to that in 1837 ensued, characterized by an internal drain, a rise in Bank Rate, and a decline in prices. A mild panic followed. In 1838, the Bank arranged for a line of credit with a consortium of Paris banks.
In negotiations between the two central banks, the Banque de France stated that its statutes would not permit it to lend money on foreign bills or securities, but that it could discount bills with bankers who would lend to the Bank of England through the house of Barings as intermediary. A syndicate of 12 of the most prominent Paris banks under the leadership of Hottinguer arranged the line of credit. In 1839 £2 million was drawn, which allowed the Bank of England to avoid a suspension of convertibility (Flandreau, 1997) . A line of credit for £900,000 was also arranged with banks in Hamburg (Kindleberger, 1989, p. 204) .
1846-1847
This crisis affected both the Bank of England and the Banque de France. In December 1846, the Banque de France faced a drastic decline in its specie reserves, consequent upon a bad harvest. To avoid suspension, Hottinguer arranged with Barings in London for a syndicate of bankers to provide silver to the Banque in exchange for French 5% rentes. The syndicate obtained 25 million francs of silver from the Bank of England.
Across the channel, the Bank of England reacted to declining gold reserves by raising the Bank Rate. This ended the boom, caused prices to fall, and triggered a major banking panic, which ended only with an announcement that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had signed a letter temporarily suspending the Bank Charter Act. The letter allowed the Bank to issue more notes than its gold reserves would cover. This action obviated the need for a rescue.
1857
Suspension of convertibility in the United States in 1857 was the start of the crisis. Correspondent banks in Liverpool were immediately affected. A gold drain led the Bank of England to raise the Bank Rate, and a panic followed. As in 1847, it took a Treasury letter to end it. Negotiations to arrange a rescue loan from the Banque de France broke down. According to Flandreau, cooperation between the two central banks in the 1850s was hampered once Paris started operating on a predominantly gold basis.
In the following three decades the two authorities often competed for gold by raising discount rates. 6 On only one occasion in those decades, 1860, before the outbreak of the American Civil War, was a swap arranged, under the auspices of Rothschilds and Barings, of £2 million in silver for the same amount in gold. To finance the deficit, the Treasury ran down the stock of gold and legal tenders. Presentation of the legal tenders outstanding for redemption threatened the gold reserve. The Treasury attempted, in January and November 1894, to restore its gold reserve at a minimum to $100 million by offering for public subscription $50 million l0-year 5% bonds.
8
Unsuccessful in this attempt, in February 1895, the Treasury secretary contracted with the Belmont-Morgan banking syndicate, under a law which authorized him to purchase coin on terms he negotiated, to market a 4% bond issue, and provide the Treasury with a 6-month short-term interest-free gold credit line to restore the gold reserve. One half of the 3.5 million ounces of gold delivered was to be shipped from followed the Bank of England's refusal to provide assistance to Overend Gurney, but it ended with the temporary suspension of the Bank Charter Act-the last time it was ever invoked.
7 The September 1998 $3.5 billion rescue of the Wall Street hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management by a consortium of private investment banks, under the auspices of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, is reminiscent of the 1890 rescue of Barings. The self-interest of the rescuers in both cases explains their willingness to invest in a failing enterprise. This time, however, the Reserve bank did not contribute funds to the lifeboat, as the Bank of England did, and the consortium acquired a 90% interest in the rescued hedge fund, which may not survive. The rescue of Long-Term Capital Management also brings to mind the insolvency of Barings in 1995, when an unsupervised trader in Singapore (not the highly qualified partners of the hedge fund) made interest rate bets that eroded the capital of the venerable investment bank. 8 The subscribers, however, used legal tenders to obtain gold to pay for the bonds, with no increment to the gold reserve. In January 1895, a run on gold in exchange for legal tenders reduced the reserve to $45 million.
Europe at a rate not exceeding 300,000 ounces a month. The syndicate agreed to protect the Treasury against gold withdrawals paid out to redeem legal tenders or sold to obtain exchange. It delivered an additional $25 million in gold in exchange for legal tenders, and borrowed exchange in London to sell in New York, effectively controlling the exchange market. The syndicate marketed the bonds for a total of $68.8 million. 9 3. 1.2.3. 1906-1907 In response to a gold outflow to the booming US markets, late in 1906 the Bank of England raised the discount rate to 6% and restricted credit to financial houses operating in the American trade. Fearing a threat to its authority, the Bank turned down the offer of a direct loan by the Banque de France (Kindleberger, 1989) . Instead, the Bank agreed that the Banque would discount more than 65 million francs in foreign bills between December 1906 and March 1907 and refrain from raising its discount rate-policies designed to direct gold to the Bank of England. A panic in New York spread to London in the fall of 1907. The Bank again raised the Bank Rate, this time to 7%. As in the previous year, both the Banque de France and the German Reichsbank allowed their reserves to decline, transferring gold to England to permit England's transfer of gold to the US. At the height of the crisis in November, the Banque purchased up to 80 million francs in sterling bills, and forwarded 80 million francs in gold eagles to London.
We note minor rescues of European central banks in 1909-1910. 10 
The interwar period 1919-1939
Monetary authorities obtained two types of international loans during the interwar period: stabilization loans to aid countries in achieving the conditions necessary to restore gold convertibility, and rescue loans in conditions of financial crisis. The regime that was restored from 1924 to 1936 was a gold exchange standard that differed profoundly from the pre-1914 gold standard. Flaws in the structure and inappropriate policies by its members meant that whatever attempts at rescues that were made when crises struck in 1931 were doomed from the start.
The 1931 crises started with the declaration of insolvency by the Credit Anstalt, 9 During the 5 months after the contract was signed, no gold was withdrawn from the Treasury. At the end of August 1895, when agricultural exports and associated gold imports rose, the syndicate was dissolved. During the electoral campaign in 1896, domestic accumulation of gold by the public and gold exports resumed in response to the strength of the pro-silver forces, and gold reserves declined. Once the Republicans won the election, pressure on the dollar eased, this time permanently.
10 In 1909 and 1910, the Banque used techniques developed in earlier crises of discounting sterling bills to ease seasonal strains on the Bank of England. Eichengreen (1992, Chapter 1) documents cases of cooperation between European central banks, and cases when the Banque and the Reichsbank refrained from tightening their policies in response to gold drains in order to aid the Bank of England. During this period the Banque held massive gold reserves and was reluctant to vary the discount rate. Flandreau (1997) and Patron (1910) believe that the Banque was willing to lend its gold to other central banks as a way to protect itself from foreign-induced panics. Its actions were not part of a concerted effort at cooperation, as Eichengreen argues, but were unilateral, and were taken in its own interests.
Austria's largest bank, on May 17, 1931. The Credit Anstalt was then recapitalized by the Austrian government. A run on other Austrian banks ensued. The Austrian National Bank, as lender of last resort, engaged in discount window lending. Fears that expansionary monetary policy would reignite the hyperinflation that Austria suffered in the 1920s led to a run on the reserves of the Austrian National Bank.
The Austrian authorities tried to stem the crisis by soliciting a foreign loan of 100 million schillings ($14 million) from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The credit was quickly exhausted. A request for a second loan foundered amid a squabble between France and the other powers. The Bank of England then unilaterally extended a loan of 50 million schillings ($7 million) for a week (Eichengreen, 1992; Kindleberger, 1989) . When a rise in the discount rate proved ineffectual in defusing the speculative attack, exchange controls were imposed and Austria in effect left the gold standard.
The crisis spread to Germany, as foreign depositors feared the Austrian events would be repeated in a country with a similar banking system and similar problems. The final act of the crisis was a speculative attack on sterling. The combination of the continental banking crisis, which froze debts payable to British banks, and a worsening current account deficit and growing budget deficit, placed mounting pressure on the Bank of England's gold reserves. Bank rate was raised twice in July from 2.5 to 4.5%. In the final week of July 1931, the Bank of England obtained matching credits of £25 million from the Banque de France and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The amount was inadequate to halt the run. Further loans to Britain of $200 million each from a syndicate formed by J.P. Morgan in New York and a syndicate in Paris also proved inadequate. With reserves dwindling, the Government suspended convertibility on September 19, 1931.
The dollar and the gold bloc
Britain's departure from gold was followed by the departure of 24 other countries. No rescue loans were made between the third quarter of 1931 and April 1933, when the dollar began to float.
Once the US and its trading partners devalued their currencies, the pressure spread in 1935 to the currencies of the gold bloc countries (France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Poland and Switzerland), the only major ones freely convertible into gold.
The need for fiscal austerity was undermined by rearmament expenditures. 
Post-mortem
An argument has been made that had rescue loans of sufficient magnitude been advanced and had the central bank cooperation that prevailed before 1914, or in the 1920s, been extended, the crisis of 1931 could have been prevented (Eichengreen, 1992) . Alternatively, had an international lender of last resort been present, it could have saved the day (Kindleberger, 1989) . It seems doubtful that either cooperation or an international lender of last resort would have worked. The fundamental problem of worldwide deflation and depression lay with the incorrect policies followed by the US and France, which combined with the flawed structure of the gold exchange standard inflicted depression and deflation on the central European countries with weak banking systems. Without a reversal of the deflationary policy stance of the Federal Reserve and the Banque de France, successful rescues would have been short-lived. In the case of the UK, no rescue no matter how large would have allowed her to preserve the parity.
This begs the issue of the role of an international lender of last resort, an entity capable of supplying unlimited amounts of high-powered money in international currency (then gold) which did not then or has ever existed. Even if such an agency, designed on the lines of Keynes (1930) Supernational Central Bank, existed, had it followed the classic Bagehotian strictures of lending at a penalty rate on the basis of sound collateral to illiquid but solvent borrowers, it is doubtful that it would have made the rescues.
As Hawtrey stated, "Unlimited credits would have enabled the country to remain on the gold standard, prolonging conditions that were rapidly becoming intolerable … the lesson: if the country can maintain the monetary standard without undue stress, then grant unlimited credit; but if the effort of maintaining parity is excessive, no credits and allow the currency to depreciate" (Hawtrey, 1932, pp. 229-232) .
Bretton Woods
The framers of the Bretton Woods agreement in July 1944 established an international monetary framework that would overcome the perceived problems of the interwar period, especially the perceptions that capital flows (hot money movements) were a key source of the instability of the 1930s and that international cooperation had failed. Embedded in the Articles of Agreement was a proscription of free capital mobility.
Once the European members declared current account convertibility in December 1958 the system quickly evolved into a gold dollar standard with many of the flaws of the interwar gold exchange standard combined with some new ones: the inability of the adjustable peg to adjust because of fear of the speculative attack that would ensue if even the hint of devaluation were made; and the inability to seal off capital flows (Bordo, 1993) . These flaws opened up the prospects of currency crises in the face of inconsistency between domestic financial policies and/or changing competitiveness and the declared peg.
In addition to crises facing the members of the system, which in some respects echoed the events of the interwar experience, the Bretton Woods system was threatened by a systemic crisis. As outstanding dollar liabilities increased relative to US gold reserves, so did the likelihood of a run on the center country of the system.
Below we describe the rescues based on IMF loans and G-10 Basle Arrangements of members facing currency crises and the unsuccessful policies by the US and other members to save the system. To limit the length of the paper, we exclude from the text and from Table 1 the details of the stabilization loan to Britain in 1947 that proved unsuccessful. Table 1 , however, includes the details of the rescue loans occasioned by the Suez crisis in 1956-1957, the 1962 loans to Canada, when it abandoned a floating exchange rate, and the 1964 loans to Italy to curb reserve losses.
Rescues under Bretton Woods 3.3.1.1. Sterling 1961-1967
Expansionary policy and rapid growth in 1959 led to a current account deficit in 1960 and a crisis in March 1961. It was alleviated by a BIS credit put together by eight countries for $810 million (£325 million). On July 25, 1961, the UK adopted an austerity program, drew $1.5 million from the IMF and received a further standby credit of $400 million. The pressure on sterling abated, allowing the UK to repay its credits while retaining a standby loan of $100 million from the IMF (Tew, 1988) .
With an improvement in the balance of payments, policy switched to ease in 1962 and was expansionary throughout 1963. By the time the Labour party was elected on October 16, 1964, the current account had deteriorated quite markedly, and reserves declined rapidly. The Wilson government refused to devalue, announced an import surcharge on October 26, but did not depart from its expansionary policy. The balance of payments continued to deteriorate, reserves declined, speculation against sterling mounted, and, on November 25, a $4 billion rescue package was arranged with the G-10 and the IMF ($3 billion from the G-10 plus Switzerland, the BIS and the US Export-Import Bank, a $1 billion standby loan from the IMF's General Arrangement to Borrow [GAB] ).
The authorities continued to maintain a relatively expansionary policy through 1965, and pressure on sterling reserves continued. In March the Bank of England drew on its swap credits with the Federal Reserve and other central banks. In May, the UK drew $2.4 billion from the IMF under the GAB (Solomon, 1982, p. 59) .
A tight budget package was instituted in July 1965, along with restrictions on capital outflows. The pressure temporarily abated but arose anew in the spring and summer of 1966. This time a massive austerity program was instituted on July 20, and external assistance was provided by the Federal Reserve and other central banks (the Federal Reserve swap facility with the Bank of England was increased from $750 to $1350 million).
Declining output and rising unemployment in early 1967 led to a reversal of the tight fiscal and monetary policies. The balance of payments deteriorated in the summer of 1967. A series of adverse shocks-the closing of the Suez Canal during the Six-Day War and a dock strike in October-were contributing factors. A speculative attack on sterling was mounted in November. Loans of $1.7 billion from May to November were insufficient to stem the tide. Discussion of a $3 billion rescue package came to naught (Solomon, 1982, p. 90) . -1968-1969 Strikes and student riots in France in May 1968, to which the government responded with expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, led to a speculative flight from the franc and a considerable drop in French international reserves. The pressure was alleviated by a massive rescue package organized by the US in June (France's $100 million swap line with the Federal Reserve was increased to $700 million and it also obtained $745 million from the IMF's GAB).
The French franc
The pressure continued into the fall of 1968, but the French resisted devaluation in November, shifting to tight monetary and fiscal policy by cutting public spending, increasing indirect taxes, imposing ceilings on commercial bank lending, and raising interest rates.
These measures did not suffice to reduce the growing deficits in the French current account during the first two quarters of 1969. The French again tightened restrictions on bank credit, raised minimum requirements for hire purchase, and in July froze funds for public investment. To resist devaluation France incurred short-term debts of $2.3 billion. The drain on French reserves, however, continued. On August 10, 1969 French resistance ended. The franc was devalued by 11.11%.
Although the rescues described above were successful in the sense that they alleviated the pressure to devalue and the loans were ultimately repaid, in the end, the adjustable peg system collapsed into the managed float regime that endures to the present. Hence, at best, the rescues were holding actions.
Rescuing the dollar-1960-1971
The gold rush of October 1960 provided the first glimpse of a confidence crisis, when speculators pushed the free market price of gold on the London market up from $35.20 (the US Treasury's buying price) to $40.00. This first significant run up in gold prices since the London gold market was reopened in 1954 was supposedly triggered by concerns over a Democratic victory in the 1960 US presidential election. Kennedy's pledge "to get America moving again" was interpreted as an inflationary policy that might force the United States to devalue its currency (i.e. unilaterally raise the price of gold in terms of dollars (Solomon, 1982, p. 35) ).
In consequence, during the period 1961-1967, the United States, other countries, and the IMF activated a series of arrangements including the GAB, swaps, Roosa Bonds and the Gold Pool, designed to protect US monetary gold reserves, as well as policies to reduce the balance of payments deficits including capital controls, balance of trade measures, and altering the monetary-fiscal policy mix.
The outcome: collapse of the system
In the end, none of the measures proved successful. The Gold Pool collapsed in a speculative run from December 1967 to March 1968 in which $3 billion was lost. It was disbanded on March 17, 1968 and a two-tier arrangement put in its place. Pressure on the dollar increased over the next 3 years. US balance of payments deficits mounted beginning in 1961 consequent upon the pursuit of expansionary monetary policy to finance the war in Vietnam and increased spending on social programs. The continental European countries became increasingly unwilling to accept the inflationary consequences from the increased dollar holdings that their mounting balance of payments surpluses with the US produced. The US decision to suspend gold convertibility on August 15, 1971 was triggered by French and British intentions in early August to convert dollars into gold.
The US decision to suspend gold convertibility ended a key part of the Bretton Woods system. The remaining part of the system-the adjustable peg-disappeared 19 months later in the face of a series of monthly rolling speculative attacks.
Post-mortem
In summary, in the Bretton Woods era, many individual country rescues were temporarily successful but in the cases where inconsistencies between the fundamentals and the pegged exchange rate remained, as in the case of sterling, the rescues ultimately failed. At the same time as increasing resources were devoted to rescues, the system deteriorated because of fatal flaws reminiscent of the interwar gold exchange standard. The center country, the US, followed policies incompatible with its role, and its policies conflicted with the policies followed by the other members. Consequently, the attempts at rescue and the architecture designed to preserve the system failed. A reading of successive issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin in which details of each 'successful' rescue and plans for future defenses are described year by year until 1970, after which point nothing is said, makes the point.
Post-Bretton Woods, 1973-1990
The OPEC oil embargo in the 1970s dominated international events. Loans extended to low-income countries were structural and humanitarian, to enable them to buy high-priced oil. They were not rescue loans. A similar observation applies to the recycled loans by syndicated commercial banks in advanced countries, in which OPEC deposited the huge increase in its income. Those loans were extended mainly to the Latin American public sector, but the private sector also assumed a heavy burden of debt. Debt service, including short-term amortization, represented a claim that virtually exhausted current account income. As foreign debt continued to increase, and the ratio of public debt to GDP soared, capital flight became pronounced. Debt service by the public and private sectors came to a halt in 1982.
The strategy of national authorities in the face of this crisis was to protect the lending banks. They were cajoled to extend enough new loans to the borrowers to enable them to pay interest, and thus avoid the designation of the original loans as nonperforming on the banks' books. This strategy, also followed by the IMF, which lent enough to borrowing countries to keep up debt service, was maintained until 1987 when the banks began to provision the Latin American loans (Schwartz, 1989) . The solution of writing down the loans was not adopted until the end of the decade when Brady zero-coupon bonds were sold by the US Treasury to the Latin American governments. This was no international rescue.
International bailouts in the 1990s
We distinguish rescue loans extended before the 1990s from bailout loans made during the 1990s. Rescue loans were made in an attempt to prevent a devaluation or abandonment of a pegged exchange rate by the core industrialized countries. They were temporary loans, at commercial market interest rates, limited in magnitude, but sufficient to offset a current account deficit. No taxpayer money was involved. Loans in the past accompanied a package of remedial policies.
Loans in this decade have been extended to newly emerging countries after their attempt to defend a peg has failed. The loans have been multiples of the amounts that were granted in past decades. The recent loans are designed to offset a capital account outflow, the effect of which was to endanger repayment of the lenders. The size of the loan is large enough to provide the wherewithal to repay foreign and domestic lenders. A wealth transfer from taxpayers to wealthy recipients is involved. That is why the chief indictment of the bailout model of international lending is that it promotes moral hazard. Lenders presume that, whether or not the resources they provide to the borrowers are put to productive use, they are not at risk because a bailout package will protect them. Borrowers presume that, if there is a reversal of the conditions that invited inflows of funds, their debts will be repaid by others or drastically discounted.
In the years before the 1990s, the motivation for a rescue loan was that the loan would improve conditions in the country that was helped, not that other countries would be harmed if the rescue loan were not extended. It has become dogma since the Mexican bailout in 1995 that there was a tequila effect. The rationale for a rescue loan has been transformed. Now it is asserted that the failure to lend to a troubled economy would cause its troubles to spill over to other countries in the region and even worldwide. For this reason, according to the dogma, it is urgent to rescue the original troubled economy to avert undeserved calamity elsewhere.
The observations on the basis of which the dogma has been established are that the currencies and stock markets of countries other than the original one to surface with problems have suffered declines. These observations are cited as evidence of contagion. If this evidence is disputed, on the grounds that each of the secondary countries had problems that accounted for investors' disaffection, the riposte is that investors would have ignored those problems but for the attention focused on the original country's difficulties.
Basically, this is an argument that investors don't discriminate between economies with more or less severe financial predicaments and punish all alike. Yet yield spreads over US Treasuries for emerging market sovereign bonds, in response to Russian default on its ruble debt in August 1998, varied widely among Latin American, Asian and East European countries. The market appeared to differentially evaluate the risk of default and devaluation by each emerging country. This suggests that the emphasis on contagion in support of bailouts is overblown.
We discuss the salient bailouts of the period: Mexico in 1994-1995; Asian countries in 1997-1998; and Russia in 1998.
Mexico in 1994-1995
Many factors contributed to the makings of the Mexican financial crisis. One factor was the fact that the narrow band within which the exchange rate of the peso was permitted to depreciate failed to reflect the growing discrepancy between the US and Mexican inflation rates. Accordingly, the peso was overvalued and the current account deficit as a percent of GDP kept rising. Another factor was the decision of monetary authorities to substitute dollar-linked short-term Tesobonos for pesodenominated Cetes. The government did so because it could sell Cetes only by offering higher yields than Tesobonos investors demanded. Keeping interest rates below their equilibrium level was a strategy to support the real economy, which was growing only anemically, and the banking system, with a rising ratio of nonperforming loans. At the same time, the central bank sterilized outflows of foreign capital by increasing the monetary base, which added to inflationary pressure. Outflows were motivated by political unrest in a southern Mexican province and the assassination of the candidate for president of the PRI, the main political party. Short-term public debt amounted to $16 billion when the new president took office in December 1994, and international reserves were $10 billion (Edwards, 1998) . Widening the band on the exchange rate did nothing to allay the alarm of domestic and foreign investors about Mexico's financial problems. Foreign capital fled, and the peso was freed to float see Edwards and Savastano (1998) . In addition to borrowing from the Federal Reserve and the ESF, Mexico obtained loans from the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The IMF on February 1, 1995, agreed to a standby loan of 12.7 billion SDR with an expiration date of February 15, 1997. 3.312 billion SDR was undisbursed. Repayment was due 3-5 years after the expiration of the loan. The BIS was expected to participate in loans to Mexico, but it is not clear that it did so.
The Mexican bailout has been hailed by the official lenders as a great success. The US Treasury has even boasted of early repayment by Mexico, and the magnitude of the interest earnings on the loans. Political pressure for early repayment arose because of Congressional disapproval of the Treasury's role in orchestrating the package of international loans. Early repayment was made possible by Mexico's borrowing abroad at interest rates higher than the Treasury charged. One counterfactual point is that, in the absence of Treasury intervention, Mexico could have tapped the capital markets directly, since it could offer collateral of oil revenues, and was 11 On January 11 and 13, Mexico drew on its short-term swap lines with both the Federal Reserve and the ESF, amounting to $250 million on each occasion from each source (at an annual interest rate of 5.9%). On February 2, it drew $1 billion from each short-term facility (at an annual interest rate of 5.8%). On March 14, it drew $3 billion from the ESF medium-term facility, and repaid the January short-term drawings (at an interest rate of 8.2%). The February 2 borrowing from each source was renewed when due 91 days later on May 3 (at an interest rate of 5.45%). The renewal date after August 1 would have been October 30. On October 10, however, Mexico repaid $350 million of the $1 billion it owed each authority. The balance of $650 million due to each that was renewed on October 30 (at an interest rate of 5.25%) on January 29, 1996, was repaid (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1995a System, , b, c, 1996a .
Three more drawings of $3 billion (April 19), $2 billion (May 19), and $2.5 billion (July 5) were made by Mexico on the medium-term ESF facility for a total of $10.5 billion, the first two at an interest rate of 10.16%, the last at 9.2%. willing to pay a market rate of interest that reflected credit risk. In respect of the success of the bailout, two measures are the size of its federal debt-in 1997 larger than in 1994 when the peso was devalued-and the level of its per capita real GDPbarely equal in 1997 to the 1994 level. Average Mexican incomes were about half what they were in 1994, and a third of the population lived much below the poverty line. The Mexican stock market in December 1997 stood at about half its pre-devaluation value in dollar terms. The banking problems of insolvent institutions and high ratios of nonperforming loans that existed in 1994 still exist in 1998.
Asian country loans
Banking crises are the common element of the Asian financial difficulties in the 1990s. The banking crises occurred because of an earlier excessive expansion of credit. Capital inflows consequent upon liberalization were the source of the credit expansion in Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea and Indonesia. It was not contagion from Thailand that made the other Asian countries vulnerable to a financial crisis. They were vulnerable because of their home-grown problems. The origins of the banking problems were an increase in their lending power, and a decrease in the creditworthiness of the projects they financed. Their own unsound performance in lending and asset acquisitions, and their lack of adequate capital account for the banks' poor condition. In all the countries credit allocation has not been market driven. Political influence has been exerted on the banks to lend as directed. Regulatory corruption has occurred to shield banks from penalties for not observing regulations. The expansion of bank credit has been channeled to loans for the creation of unprofitable industrial capacity and the purchase of equities and real estate. The bubbles in asset prices burst for commercial property prices between 1990 and 1995, for residential property prices between 1992 and 1997. As the value of the asset collateral held by banks declined, the pressure on leveraged investors to sell exacerbated downward pressure on prices. The capital from abroad became the basis for nonperforming loans by Asian banks.
Even if the authorities permitted the banks to operate, the general perception was that they were undercapitalized and the book value of their assets far exceeded the market value. Many banks were insolvent. Yet it was not the condition of the banks that triggered the financial crisis. In each country the exchange rate was pegged to the dollar or another hard currency. The trigger was a currency crisis.
Because local lenders harbored doubts about the future value of the domestic currency, as seen in a risk premium on domestic securities, nonfinancial firms and governments of the Asian countries issued interest-bearing debt denominated in foreign currencies at lower interest rates. Companies borrowed in dollars or yen but earned revenue in local currencies. These companies are now vulnerable to the increase in the burden of their foreign indebtedness given their limited ability to repay it.
Finally, the foreign exchange reserves of the Asian countries were far from ample. To defend the exchange rate the central bank would have had to tighten monetary policy to convince the market that it would not devalue. To tighten, however, would restrict economic growth, already slowing, and exacerbate the problems of distressed financial institutions.
The foreign exchange market summed up these concerns about the Asian countries by selling off their currencies. Stock market declines matched the currency declines. It was not, however, overreaction by foreign investors following the fall of the baht that led the Indonesian rupiah, the Malaysian ringgit, and the South Korean won to slip their pegs. It was, in each case, a growing current account deficit, excessive short-term foreign borrowing, a banking sector weighed down by speculative property loans, corrupt government and business practices that accounted for the currency's fate (Schwartz, 1998) .
Of the four Asian countries, only Malaysia refrained from requesting IMF assistance. In August 1997, a $17.2 billion rescue package was assembled for Thailand by the IMF and Asian countries, including a $4 billion standby credit (505% of its quota), a multilateral loan of $2.7 billion, and a bilateral loan of $10.3 billion. The IMF disbursed $2.8 billion of its standby credit. In November, the IMF agreed to give Indonesia a standby credit of $11.2 billion (490% of its quota), of which $5 billion was made immediately available. The total loan package, including commitments from other official facilities and bilateral sources, amounted to $42.3 billion. In July 1998 the IMF and other international lenders promised Indonesia an additional $6 billion. In December 1997, the IMF approved a $20.9 billion loan over 3 years for South Korea, of which it disbursed $17 billion immediately. The total loan package came to $58.2 billion. The source of these figures is the IMF (1998, p. 24) .
In none of the Asian countries has the banking problem been resolved. Negotiations with foreign lenders have established frameworks for restructuring debts, but not at the level of the individual company borrower and its foreign lender. The Asian countries have not yet begun sustained recoveries. Russia, 1992 Russia, -1998 The Russian economy has made unsuccessful efforts to convert a command economy into a market-oriented one for 7 years. The basic command structure remains, with state enterprises, whether or not nominally privatized, operating as before. Foreign investors have bought government bonds with high yields, but the government has been unable to collect tax revenue sufficient to pay for its outlays. Enormous arrears of wages and pensions due to government employees in state enterprises and in the military and pensioners have mounted. The infrastructure of courts, a legal system, and property rights still do not exist. Reform pledges have not been kept. A bout of hyperinflation after the collapse of the soviet regime ended when the central bank gained control of the supply of rubles.
Financial crisis in
Political disarray and financial turmoil in the summer of 1998 have resulted in chaos in the economy. In August, the government defaulted on $40 billion of rubledenominated bonds and unilaterally rescheduled the loan on confiscatory terms. Many Russian private banks are insolvent, but thanks to politically influential owners continue to operate. In July the central bank injected liquidity by cutting reserve requirements for the banks, to enable them to meet obligations to creditors and depositors. The banks, however, used the rubles to buy dollars. The central bank then began a massive intervention in support of the ruble, losing reserves at an alarming rate. It gave up after the ruble weakened upon widening the trading band. Thereupon, the central bank suspended trading in foreign currencies indefinitely. After a change in the prime minister and the governor of the central bank, the government announced that it would increase the supply of rubles until the end of the year, in order to repay outstanding arrears, whatever the inflationary consequences.
In August 1992, April 1995 and March 1996, the IMF lent Russia a total of 11.933 billion SDR in exchange for promises of reform. In July 1998, it approved an $11.2 billion loan, conditional on the reforms that were promised in 1992: reducing the fiscal deficit, dealing with banking sector problems, controlling government debt. The IMF has repeatedly suspended loans to Moscow because of its failure to live up to its promises, but has then resumed lending for fear of contagion.
Conclusions
What have we learned from this extended survey of international lending across two centuries?
1. Our first conclusion contrasts the experience of the period before 1973 with that of subsequent decades. International lending then constituted rescues of monetary authorities of advanced countries temporarily short of liquidity. Their difficulties were resolved with relatively small amounts of money, sufficient to stave off devaluation or abandonment of a fixed exchange rate while remedial policies were put in place. Taxpayers' funds were not required. Recent experience of bailouts involve handing over relatively large amounts to both foreign lenders and domestic investors of emerging countries after devaluation of a pegged exchange rate to avoid their incurring wealth losses. These are transfers from the less wealthy to the wealthier. 2. The opening of capital markets after 50 years of impediments to free flows enabled emerging countries to borrow vast amounts from the advanced countries (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998; Bordo et al., 1998) . The net flows today rival those of the golden age of European overseas investment before 1914, and the gross flows are a multiple of those in earlier times. The liberalization of the capital accounts in addition to creating opportunities for growth in the emerging countries has exposed them to serious hazards. Lenders may ignore structural problems of underdevelopment in these countries and incorrect policies in their eagerness to profit from the promise of high-yielding investments. Lenders are not fully informed about internal conditions in emerging countries, and borrowers may not put the funds made available to them to their best use. In this respect the boom-bust cycle of international borrowing repeats events of the nineteenth century. Prominent examples include British lending to the United States in the 1830s on which a number of states defaulted, and Latin American booms followed by busts and defaults in the 1820s, 1870s and 1890s (Marichal, 1989) .
3. What is different in today's boom-bust episodes from earlier ones is the belief that domestic financial institutions are protected by an internal safety net and that foreign lenders will not suffer losses on their loans in hard currencies because funds to compensate them will be made available by the multiple international lending agencies and the monetary authorities of the advanced countries. In earlier times losses were actually sustained by lenders, and by borrowers who were then cut off from further loans. Eventually, settlement of outstanding debts was reached, but at the cost of cessation of economic growth. Moral hazard weakens incentives for lenders to monitor the performance of both the private and public sectors where they invest. By contrast, in earlier times, presumably both borrowers and lenders learned the hard lesson that caution paid. 4. Why has moral hazard assumed an important role in the environment of the 1990s? We can think of four explanations. The first is contagion. The second is 'too big to fail'. The third is extension of the safety net. The fourth is, an implicit contract with the IMF. In simplest terms, the argument for the threat of contagion is that failure to bail out investors in one emerging country's markets will spill over to other emerging markets, so investors, fearful of getting burned, will abandon those markets as well. Pure contagion would occur only in circumstances in which other emerging countries were free of the problems facing the first emerging country. We know of no evidence of pure contagion. Transmission is another story. Shocks to one country will spill over to other countries through trade and the capital accounts. When investors withdraw their capital from countries with the same problems as were present in the first such country, this is a demonstration effect, not contagion.
As for 'too big to fail', this is a fallacy that domestic lenders of last resort should supply liquidity to insolvent institutions because not to do so would endanger the stability of the entire financial system. The fallacy is that markets cannot distinguish between illiquid and insolvent institutions, and that normal bankruptcy procedures will not allocate resources in a timely fashion to their best use.
Extension of the safety net to cover investors' foreign holdings, such as large investment firms, presumes that the national welfare depends on their welfare. It is far from clear that protection of any sector or industry benefits the whole economy.
Finally, emerging countries may believe that they have an implicit contract with the IMF to be saved from their own folly. This is an expansion of the original terms of the Articles of Agreement at Bretton Woods that established the IMF as a social insurance fund in which members contributed resources, which would be made available to them or other members as needed. Members could have access to the fund in the event of temporary current account imbalances. Capital movements then were proscribed. Today, capital mobility has been restored, and the size of the drawings required greatly exceed any one country's initial deposit or line of credit. Massive loans from other members at below market rates are now expected. One could argue that higher tranche IMF loans are subject to conditionality, and therefore are not free from penalty. However, in contrast to rescues of earlier times, where loans were offered attendant upon remedial policies, conditionality has proved to be more easily evaded. 5. A pervasive problem in the case of all the crises was pegged exchange rates. In the recent examples, loans were extended by foreign commercial banks and other private lenders at interest rates that did not account for exchange risk based on the incorrect belief that adherence to the peg was durable and credible. This experience supports floating exchange rates to avoid speculative attacks on pegs (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) . If countries maintain floating exchange rates, capital markets should be able to handle any exigencies of both private and public finance. On the other hand, in normal times small open economies may be well advised to link their national currencies to the currency of a larger trading partner. In those cases, however, when countries are faced with large foreign shocks, they have to weigh the costs of sticking to the peg against the benefits. 6. The rescues of earlier times that were successful teach us that one should rescue a monetary authority that has a temporary liquidity problem, is adopting remedial policies, and has a good chance of timely repayment. Today's monetary authorities, including the IMF, should follow Bagehot's principles: lend at short term at a penalty rate on good collateral that exceeds the value of the loan. However, in a world of deep capital markets, such as prevails today, there are few good reasons why the private markets cannot perform this role.
